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1. Introduction
As concern over climate change garners attention the question of whether it is happening
gives way to what policymakers should do about it. The question of policy is an economic one.
This research is necessary because climate change, left unchecked, threatens to permanently
change our environment.
In Economic terms, CO2 emissions would be described as an externality. The industries
that produce the pollutant do not pay for the damages they inflict on the environment.
Economists have deliberated on such externalities before. In a classic experiment, Plott argued
that policy measures to internalize these externalities were necessary. That is, policies that
include the cost of pollution in the economic decisions made by firms and consumers should be
enacted. His reasoning, and experimental results, suggested that mere concern over the welfare
of others is not sufficient to protect society from environmental damages (1983).
Plott, however, did not consider a further complication of environmental economics. A
politically attractive solution to climate change is to support research and development (R&D) as
an answer to climate change. The studies I consider here will consider this question in
conjunction with methods of internalizing climate change externalities.
2. The Economics of Emissions Control
Previous literature reviews exist for the economics of emissions control and so this
section will be a summary discussion of them. The focus of this paper is the relationship between
emissions control measures and emissions R&D. For a more extended discussion of
environmental experimental economics see Noussair and Soest (2014), and Friesen and
Gangadharan (2013). Emissions control can be achieved through either a carbon tax or a capand-trade approach. There is some dispute over which is socially preferable and how to
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implement either. The trade-offs are that cap-and-trade generally requires less action on the part
of the government and allows for control over the quantity of emissions, while a carbon tax is the
more price stable alternative (Congressional Budget Office, 2008).
Because of the relative price stability of a carbon tax the Congressional Budget Office
argues it is more efficient for the United States’ purposes than a cap and trade program (2008).
They argue that there are rising marginal costs to reducing emissions as firms use the cheapest
ways to reduce emissions first. But the marginal benefit of having less emissions remains
constant. In other words, a cheaply eliminated unit of emissions has the same effect on climate
change as does a more costly eliminated one. A cap-and-trade program would be inflexible in its
response to these rising marginal costs, while a tax would not be. These issues are, however, only
tangentially related to the relationship between emissions-saving policy of either kind and their
effects on R&D. Both seek to address only one of the two salient market failures.
The environmental market failure has been described in terms of an externality already.
But R&D is associated with positive externalities as well. Addressing both externalities is
considered the dominant strategy in the literature. For example, though there is substantial
support for the development of emissions-saving technology in Europe (Bye & Jacobsen, 2011),
R&D in the absence of environmental policies against pollution is likely to be below the socially
optimal level (Jaffe, Newell, & Stavins, 2005).
Besides being politically expedient, emissions-saving R&D has an economic argument
for its support instead of emissions reducing technology (Jaffe, Newell, & Stavins, 2005). If an
effective carbon-abatement technology could be produced emissions reduction would be
unnecessary. Yet this is unlikely as R&D is a product of investment and subject to two
significant externalities. First, without emissions reducing policy, emissions-saving R&D would
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be unprofitable for any given firm. Secondly, R&D is subject to the externalities described by
Romer in the following section.
3. Theoretical R&D Background: Endogenous Technological Change
A typical macroeconomics textbook will present a growth accounting equation in which
the total output of the economy depends on factors like capital, labor, and productivity inputs.
While the factors in my textbook that drive capital and labor growth get their own chapters
endogenous growth theory, the study of factors that drive productivity growth, gets three pages
(Abel, Bernanke, & Croushore, 2011, p. 206, 228-231). The disparity is not particularly
surprising. Modeling endogenous growth is difficult, and challenges core macroeconomic
assumptions. When Romer uses this model he explains that “price-taking competition cannot be
supported” and so instead he finds an equilibrium under monopolistic competition (1989).
The conclusion Romer comes to which is of most interest is that too little human capital
will be devoted to R&D in equilibrium. The theory is that this is because oftentimes the product
of R&D is excludable, but nonrival. With R&D, this is often called knowledge spillovers. That
is, using the patent system, a good produced by one firm’s research can be excluded from
another, but the second firm’s consumption of that good does not rival the initial producer’s
consumption of it. Because of this nonrival consumption knowledge spillovers are created. It
follows from this that in perfect competition no private firm will participate in R&D. After all,
there is nothing stopping the firm’s many competitors from stealing their research and thus
matching their costs. When this happens, the researching firm has only the costs of research and
no benefits from it. This is the reason the Solow model takes productivity as exogenous (Romer,
1989, p. 7).
Because of this market failure and environmental market failures, Jaffe et al. argue for a
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“portfolio of public policies that foster emissions reduction as well as the development and
adoption of environmentally beneficial technology” (2005, p. 1). Adding the environment into
the picture, however, complicates the picture of R&D spillovers somewhat:
This means that a specified level of environmental cleanup can be achieved at
lower total cost to society, and it also means that a lower total level of pollution
can be attained more efficiently than would be expected if the cost of cleanup
were higher. Thus, in this simple static picture, technology improvements can be
good for the environment and good for the firm that must meet environmental
mandates. (Jaffe, Newell, & Stavins, 2005, p. 166)
Thus there is a dynamic relationship between technology and environmental protection. Given
that there is an interplay between R&D and emissions policy, it may be advantageous for a
country to incentivize emissions-saving R&D in particular. In fact, this is exactly the question
Bye and Jacobsen as well as Schneider and Goulder consider, as I describe in the following
section.
Jaffe et al. break up the externalities associated with emissions R&D into knowledge and
adoption externalities (2005). The knowledge spillovers are as they are described by Romer. The
adoption externalities, however, may also have dynamic increasing returns. This stems from the
fact that a technology diffuses gradually. Simply observing another firm using a new piece of
technology can create a positive externality as the observer may become convinced that the
technology is superior and subsequently reaps some benefit from it. There are also network
externalities. Some technologies become more valuable as more people use them. Finally, there
are “learning-by-doing” supply-side externalities. This refers to the fact that some technologies
become easier to use with experience of using them. Together, these externalities mean almost
all environmental economists recommend a combination of emissions-saving subsidies of some
kind and emissions-reducing taxes or cap-and-trade policies. An early General Equilibrium
Model employed by Schneider and Goulder makes just this argument (1997).
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4. General Equilibrium Model
General Equilibrium Models (GEM) are a logical choice for the study of emissions
control as any such control affects many markets. While partial equilibrium models are far more
familiar to new students of economics, a carbon tax would influence not just those doing the
actual emitting of carbon, but those selling products that use the energy of those emissions. The
general equilibrium model allows for multiple markets to come to an equilibrium, allowing for
the effects of emissions and emissions-related R&D to be examined while holding other markets
constant.
An early GEM was used to argue that carbon taxes were a more efficient method of
limiting emissions than R&D subsidies alone (Schneider & Goulder, 1997). They find that in a
model that includes R&D spillovers, like the ones described by Romer, a carbon tax and a
targeted R&D subsidy is the least costly emissions reduction strategy.
Schneider and Goulder note that a carbon tax alone does provide some incentive for R&D
by correcting for environmental externalities (1997). This is because under carbon taxes firms
have an incentive to reduce emissions and thus have a willingness to pay for technology that
would allow them to do so. This may be of particular interest to policy makers as it is easier to
sell a voter on R&D than it is to sell them on any tax. Unfortunately, the authors note, despite the
relative unpopularity of a carbon tax a tax is still less costly than subsidies alone for the economy
as a whole (see Table A1). In their short paper, however, they do not consider a general R&D
subsidy. Bye and Jacobsen take up this case in their GEM and find that, in contrast, a targeted
R&D is not socially optimal.
Bye and Jacobsen use the GEM to analyze the relationship between R&D and a carbon
tax (2011). One complication of their study is induced technological change. That is, they do not
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make the normal assumption that technological advancement is outside of their model. Instead,
they include two R&D support strategies: general and emission-saving.
They find that the general R&D support strategy is welfare superior but that the
difference between general and emission-saving is smaller with high carbon taxes (see Table
B2). This is an intuitive finding. Most economists would expect a less efficient result if a firm’s
options were restricted: the emissions-saving strategy is just such a restriction. The shrinking
difference is also unsurprising. The substitution effect suggests that as emissions become more
expensive consumers of R&D would the relatively expensive good (emissions) for the relatively
inexpensive good (emissions-saving technology). This means the emissions-saving R&D
strategy becomes less restrictive as even without it firms would prefer it to general R&D at
higher carbon tax levels, ceteris paribus. Bye and Jacobsen argue that this is because the effects
of decreasing returns to scale and decreasing returns to knowledge are more significant in the
emissions-saving strategy.
Bye and Jacobsen take an emissions control that equals the “marginal environmental
damages” of carbon emissions as granted. This means that the tax, in whatever form it is applied,
would cost the polluter as much as the damage to the environment would harm everyone. A
possible objection to their model is that they hold environmental quality constant in their policy
simulations. While this may be realistic in the small open economy they are hypothetically
creating, in a larger economy like the United States a policy change could have a measurable
impact on environmental quality. Similarly, since a small open economy is their baseline (they
use Norway), they assume any change in emissions quantity will not affect overall prices. This
may not be a reasonable assumption for policy makers in the United States.
What Bye and Jacobsen call carbon capture technology (CCS) is the subject of the
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technological progress when their GEM uses the emissions-saving R&D. They cite an
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report for modeling several possibilities for such a
technology. They use Norway from 2002 as the base economy, and model the different strategies
as changes from that point on.
5. Conclusion
Proper execution of emissions-saving policy is nontrivial. Australia has recently made
this quite evident. Robson writes that “Australia's carbon tax experience is an interesting case
study in how not to go about implementing climate change policy” (2014, p. 43). And while
R&D is a politically expedient answer to climate change legislation, the evidence does not
support it being used alone. In Australia’s case, carbon permits were enacted on top of and in
addition to new “complementary” emissions saving policies. The net effect of these changes
were to increase energy prices, not reduce emissions, and damaged the government’s revenues
(Robson, 2014). While action is needed, climate science must not be the only research consulted
in making these decisions.
Further research on the relationship between climate change policies and R&D could add
political capital to the environmental cause. By eliminating the perception that policy makers
should choose between R&D and emissions control, and that they work best in tandem, an
argument can be made for significantly more economically-grounded legislation. While Bye and
Jacobson's research is a start in this direction, they use a model which has limited applicability to
the United States, a major CO2 producer. Extending their model could prove fruitful.
Additionally, their model used a carbon tax, which at the moment is the most realistic. A capand-trade program, however, may have R&D advantages. As of yet no such research exists.
While the GEM has attractive features about it, a laboratory experiment allows for less
assumptions than does a model which purports to simulate an entire economy. It has the
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additional benefit of circumventing criticism of the assumption that people are rational decisionmakers by using actual people to make rational decisions. Such an experiment may also be able
to incorporate the effects of political and technological uncertainty into the model. Such research
is pressing since, as Schneider and Goulder point out, the costs of emissions control increase
with time (1997).
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Appendix A
Table A1: Costs of 15% reduction in CO2 emissions 1995-2095

Source: Schneider & Goulder, 1997
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Appendix B
Table B2: Long-run effects of the R&D policy shifts. Percent changes from the baseline scenario.

Source: Bye & Jacobsen, 2011

